

# FOREIGN POLICY BULLETIN

*An analysis of current international events*



LIBRARY  
UNIV. OF THE SOUTH  
SEWANEE, TENN.

8-12

1918-1951

FOREIGN POLICY ASSOCIATION • INCORPORATED • 22 EAST 38TH STREET • NEW YORK 16, N. Y.

VOL. XXX No. 21

MARCH 2, 1951

## ***Vatican Urges Negotiations, Not Appeasement***

The pope is the only person authorized to speak for the whole Catholic Church. For this reason Catholics expect guidance from him in matters concerning faith and morals. During the twentieth century the problems underlying war and peace have been the most important and urgent moral issues facing mankind. Pius XII has not failed to clarify these issues for contemporary Catholics by outlining a definite policy for them to follow.

The program of Pius XII is not new. It is a further development and elucidation of the policy advocated by his predecessors from Leo XIII to Pius XI. This policy does not, as many suppose, float in the clouds of pure speculation; it meets the current issues on the field of reality. It is founded on moral principles which do not change, but the pope applies these unchanging principles to the constantly changing international scene.

### ***Russia and Communism***

How does Pius XII use these unchanging principles to find a solution for the cold war now being waged between Soviet Russia and the democracies?

First, he carefully distinguishes Soviet Russia from communism. His condemnation of communism as an ideology is absolute, and every pope from Leo XIII to Pius XII has consistently opposed communism under whatever guise it has appeared. It makes no difference whether it is the communism of Lenin, Trotsky, Stalin, Tito or Mao Tse-tung. It is all atheistic, based upon dialectical materialism; and the Church will never compromise with it.

One cannot crush communism by hurl-

ing atomic bombs against it but by energizing the dynamic forces of Christian faith and charity in the lives of men and by the practice of Christian social principles which counteract the evils upon

As its contribution to the "great debate," the Foreign Policy Association has invited distinguished leaders of differing opinions to present their views on the course the United States should follow in world affairs. The sixth article in the series appears in the adjoining columns.

which communism thrives. A third world war will not overcome communism, because communism is an ideology and ideologies are not vanquished by wars. In fact, a third world war is likely to accelerate the growth of communism by the frightful ruins and economic chaos it will create.

Communism is not identical with Soviet Russia. The Soviet Union is a state. It is a state which has adopted an ideology, not an ideology which has evolved into a state. For Russia, then, her existence is primary; her ideology, secondary. This was clearly established during the Second World War when Russia was consecutively allied with Nazi Germany and the democratic West, both Nazism and democracy being ideologically inimical to communism.

As long as Russia believes that war will not benefit her as a state, she will not fight. If the West demonstrates to the Russians that aggression will not profit

the Soviet Union, war can be avoided.

Like his predecessors, Pius XII strongly advocates disarmament, but only reciprocal and progressive disarmament. The disarmament after World War II was neither reciprocal nor progressive. One side alone disarmed, and the democracies disarmed too quickly. Being materialists, the Russians have genuine respect for force. Remember how Stalin allegedly asked Roosevelt how many divisions the pope had? To command Russian respect the democracies must unite behind adequate military defenses. These defense forces will convince the Russians that aggression will not pay. Once this fact becomes clear to them, the cold war can be solved by a negotiated peace.

### ***'Nothing Lost by Peace'***

A negotiated peace will not be altogether satisfactory. Concessions and sacrifices will be necessary on both sides. But this will not be appeasement because in appeasement all the sacrifices are made by one side. In appeasement there are no negotiations, merely demands on one side and surrender on the other. Pius XII urges negotiations, not appeasement. These negotiations will be successful as soon as our military defenses are powerful enough to impress the Russians.

The only alternative to negotiations is war. And Pius XII warns the world: "Nothing is lost by peace; everything can be lost by war." The consequences of modern war are impossible to foresee. When the conflict begins, no one knows how it will end. It is likely to exhaust the victor as well as the vanquished. The real issues are never settled by the war itself;

*Contents of this BULLETIN may be reproduced with credit to the Foreign Policy Association*

they are solved afterwards by negotiation. Instead of having negotiations follow war when hatred and bitterness are rife, isn't it more reasonable to negotiate before millions are victimized on the battlefields and the culture of centuries goes up in smoke?

To those who wring their hands in despair and lament the inevitability of war with Russia the pope has this inspiring advice: A good Christian faces the future armed with the virtue of hope and

confident that Divine Providence will bless and protect those nations which practice justice and charity.

Once peace has been negotiated, future disputes should be referred to the United Nations. Pius XII realizes only too well that the United Nations has many serious defects; but it is an actually existing world organization, which can be improved. As long as the United Nations has for its foundation the shifting sands of expediency, it will continue to totter and will

offer no assurance of stability in world affairs. The chief means for its improvement are a recognition of God and of the need for basing its decisions on the unchanging principles of religion.

(VERY REV.) HARRY C. KOENIG

(Librarian, St. Mary of the Lake Seminary, Mundelein, Illinois. The Committee on International Relations at the University of Notre Dame will publish the author's more complete and carefully documented account of this subject in a volume entitled *The Church and World Affairs*.)

## ***Successes in Korea Help U.S. to Stabilize Policy***

WASHINGTON—The encouraging battle reports from the Korean front have restored stability to the United States in its foreign relations. The geopolitical principle that Europe and not Asia is the bastion of our security is once more the clear basis of our approach to world affairs. The confusion over attitudes toward China which briefly endangered the country's collaboration with the North Atlantic allies (especially Britain) a few weeks ago and cast doubt on our future course within the United Nations has lifted, at least temporarily. The Administration is confident that Congress supports its policy of maintaining its strategic frontiers in central Europe. Far from contracting our obligations in Europe, as former President Herbert Hoover has suggested, Secretary of State Dean Acheson is extending them by cautious but plain hints that the United States would not stand idly by if Yugoslavia suffered military attack. Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee by Secretary Acheson, Secretary of Defense George C. Marshall and the joint chiefs of staff has placed the United States more solidly than before within the North Atlantic alliance, even though the witnesses have not wiped out the possibility that Congress will restrict in some way the President's authority to order troops to Europe in any number he sees fit.

### ***Current Foreign Policy***

The dispersal of confusion permits for the first time in months an inventory of the main features of American foreign policy. The central feature is the assumption that through the attainment of strength the United States and its Western associates can keep the peace, with strength defined primarily as military strength.

The recent increase in military strength has prompted a few official asides to the effect that military strength alone is not

enough; that nations must seek a balance between their armaments economy and their civilian economy in order to maintain real strength. The determination of the State Department to carry forward the Point Four program, even on an extremely limited scale, shows an awareness of the role of social stability in national and international strength.

Uncertainty remains, however, as to whether the United States and its allies have not gone too far in planning defense expenditures to strike an economic balance; yet at the same time the pursuit of military strength is weakened by Administration efforts to mollify those critics who object to having substantial contingents of American troops participate in the European army. The reaction has been to announce that only four more American divisions (in addition to two already abroad) will be sent to Europe. This force does not promise either to bolster effectively the defenses of Europe or to make possible a return to a demilitarized economy. In other words, the United States does not yet have the plan for achieving real strength in military or other terms. Yet the great progress made toward strength, compared with the situation of two months ago, has helped to restore the stability now emerging in America's approach to the world.

Another sign of the new stability is the fact that our relations with Europe have a harmonious note that was missing before the United Nations troops in Korea launched their present counteroffensive.

Without abandoning the hope or intention of getting a German army into the field as soon as practicable, the United States has adapted itself to the view of the Western European allies that Germany can wait until the allies have set up the framework of their own combined military force and plan. Having once more exchanged ambassadors with Spain, the

United States, out of consideration for British views, has refrained from rushing the next step—the establishment of some military understanding between Madrid and Washington.

While the United States has become acutely sensitive to the threat to Western security implicit in danger to Yugoslavia, the Administration has refrained from formally proposing that the Yugoslavs align themselves with the Marshall plan, since they have indicated informally that the suggestion is distasteful. Likewise, when the vague suggestion that Yugoslavia arrange a military compact with Greece and Turkey fell flat in Belgrade, the United States nevertheless continued to display its interest in the integrity of Yugoslavia. Assistant Secretary of State George Perkins was sent to Belgrade, and diplomatic and military conferences were convened in Turkey, where Assistant Secretary of State George McGhee paid a visit with a view to strengthening Turkey's ability to support the Yugoslav southeast flank in case of military trouble. The United States, moreover, has fallen in with the recommendations of the British and the French that the West should actually encourage the holding of a four-power conference, including the Soviet Union, this year, although the highest officials in the Administration have been lukewarm about the notion.

### ***Pacific Pact***

The vague outline of a policy is emerging even in the Far East, where John Foster Dulles, special adviser to Secretary Acheson, has enlisted the backing of the Japanese, Filipinos, Australians and New Zealanders for a Japanese treaty, provided it is associated with a Pacific pact. In such a pact the United States would be allied with the above four powers.

Nevertheless, Asia remains the continent of doubt for the United States. In the first place, the United States is pre-

pared to ask Japan to join a Pacific pact without knowing whether the postwar Japanese constitution will be amended by the repeal of the antimilitary clause. In the second place, a Japanese treaty would have to mention Formosa among the territories formerly governed by Japan. While the treaty itself may not dispose of the island, many Senators are ready to raise the subject during debate on such a treaty and thereby unsettle the Administration's policy of postponing decision about Formosa. The Administration is increasing the quantity of arms it is donating to the forces of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek on Formosa, but at the same time it is resisting the recurrent suggestions that the United States help Chiang make a foray against continental China. As long as Formosa is a question mark, the United States cannot adopt a clear-cut

policy of drawing a strategic line in Asia.

The continuing clarification of foreign policy depends on the continuation of the flow of good news from Korea. United States hopes have risen and fallen since last June according to the tone of the battle dispatches. When the news from the front was gloomiest, the differences between the United States and its allies were apt to be most intense. The change of the tide of war in our favor a few weeks ago diminished the great American interest in taking some new action in retaliation against the Chinese Communists because such action apparently is now being taken in Korea. The United Nations advance has not only given Americans a sense of confidence with respect to the Chinese Communists but toward the Soviet Union itself. In place of the fear that the Soviet Union possesses irresistible

power, the feeling is noticeable in Administration and unofficial circles that the Soviets really do not have the strength to advance wherever they wish when they wish.

Success in Korea, however, may not be permanent. The knotty problem of the 38th Parallel remains to be untied. President Truman and apparently General Douglas MacArthur incline to agree with British Prime Minister Clement R. Attlee that the UN should make no strategic advance far beyond the 38th Parallel. Before the time for decision actually arrives, the Chinese conceivably could mount another advance of their own. If a halt in the neighborhood of the Parallel produces military stability in Korea, the unfolding of American foreign policy can proceed in its present clear-cut fashion.

BLAIR BOLLES

## ***Chinese Communists Intensify Anti-Western Campaign***

During the century since the American adventurer Frederick Townsend Ward led the "Ever Victorious Army" on behalf of the beleaguered Manchus in their long and bloody struggle to suppress the revolutionary Taipings, precursors of the Chinese Communists, the United States has been deeply interested in Chinese affairs. This interest has had two parallel objectives: first, to support friendly regimes which could maintain "law and order" and carry out treaty obligations; and second, to prevent any great power from taking over control of Chinese affairs. As adapted to the present situation these historic interests suggest an effort to separate the Chinese people from their new rulers as well as an attempt to divorce those same rulers from the Russian Communist regime.

### ***Bitter Fruit***

Since the Chinese are now suffering grave losses and internal tensions because of their intervention in Korea, the United States might be able to strengthen anti-Communist and pro-American elements within China and to weaken the ties between Peiping and Moscow. To forestall such a development the Peiping regime has sponsored an anti-American and repressive campaign which is now sweeping the country. One of its latest manifestations is a law enacted by the Peiping government on February 20 imposing the death penalty or life imprisonment for 21 types of offenses. These include espionage

and sabotage, stirring up disunity and inciting "serious resistance to grain tax collection, labor service, army service or other administrative orders."

The leading part played by the United States in the Korean war has been represented by the Chinese Communists as evidence of American military aggressiveness. The fact that the Korean campaign has been largely carried on from bases in Japan and under the command of General Douglas MacArthur has been used to arouse Chinese fears of renewed Japanese aggression. Washington's efforts to negotiate a peace treaty with Japan, coupled with the recruitment and training of a 75,000-man national police force and the Far Eastern trip of John Foster Dulles, State Department adviser, have been made the subject of violent diatribes against American policy.

On December 4 Chinese Communist Foreign Minister Chou En-lai accused the United States of planning to utilize Japan as a "military base for the invasion of Korea and China." This theme has subsequently been a major feature of Peiping propaganda and of mass protest meetings.

American policy in Formosa has also been used by Peiping to bolster its war propaganda. The statement by Ernest Gross, American UN delegate, on January 21 that the United States would handle the Formosa question "in a way completely consistent with our national interest and security" has been seized upon by Peiping as proof of our hostile

intentions. Peiping has placed a similar interpretation on reports from Washington dated February 15 that the Administration is contemplating a new military assistance program of about \$50 million to strengthen the Formosa regime's defense capacity.

Peiping's apprehensions regarding Formosa are strengthened by regular Taipei radio forecasts of a counterattack and by organization of a Nationalist Mainland Commission responsible for the organization of an offensive campaign. On February 10 the Formosa radio, discussing popular opposition to the Communists, stated that the Peiping regime was "like a high tower standing on sand" and declared that "a counterattack on the mainland . . . at this time will be welcomed by the guerrillas, numbering about 11 million, and the people in general." It is not surprising that the total picture presented to the Chinese public is one of "encirclement" and hostility by the "imperialist" countries, led by the United States.

### ***'Cultural Aggression'***

Recently the Chinese Communists have added "cultural aggression" to their list of anti-American slogans. On November 28 Ambassador Warren R. Austin in a speech before the Security Council devoted considerable attention to the cultural and humanitarian activities carried on by philanthropic societies, naming the major American-subsidized colleges and univer-



sities. He noted that 15,000 Chinese had received degrees from these institutions and another 10,000 had obtained college educations in the United States. An additional 250,000 Chinese, he said, had graduated from American-financed primary and middle schools in China.

A violent reaction followed this speech. On December 14 a mass meeting in Peiping of 20,000 persons from the institutions in question denounced Austin's speech. Prominent educators issued statements repudiating any link with American policy. Mass meetings were held to denounce specific faculty members accused of serving "American imperialism."

On December 28, following the freezing of certain Chinese funds in this country, Peiping announced that all American assets in China would immediately be brought under government control, including the funds of relief and welfare enterprises. Simultaneously, 115 American-owned companies in Shanghai were placed under the direction of the city's Military Control Committee. Vice Premier Kuo Mo-jo announced that American-subsidized institutions—chiefly schools and hospitals—should become completely self-sufficient and those experiencing financial difficulties may either be nationalized or may request government aid until they have established their independence. Relief organizations are to be integrated under a People's Relief Administration and religious bodies are to be brought under full management by Chinese believers.

Meanwhile, a mass exodus of remaining foreign personnel got under way. At the end of 1950 about 500 American missionaries remained on the Chinese mainland. As late as December 15 Chinese Christians had been urging their foreign colleagues to stay. Subsequently, however, they indicated that the presence of Americans had become increasingly embarrassing to them, and since then most missionary personnel have begun to leave under instructions from their directing boards.

Recent United States policies have not only provided ammunition for use by the Chinese Communists in consolidating their grip on the country. They have also tended to strengthen the Moscow-Peiping axis. As the debate over Korea devel-

oped in the United Nations,\* the Chinese Communists were caught between opposing forces directed from Moscow and New Delhi. Peiping's initial response to the January 13 UN resolution was apparently a reflection of the Soviet Union's intransigent attitude as manifested at Lake Success. At India's urging, and as the costly military and economic consequences of the intervention in Korea began to become clear to Peiping's overconfident leaders, the Chinese issued a series of "clarifications" which almost amounted to an acceptance of the Arab-Asian proposals. Nevertheless, because of strong pressure from the United States, the resolution naming the Chinese as aggressors and establishing a procedure to study the imposition of sanctions was established, despite sharp warnings from India's Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru as well as great reluctance shown by Britain and Canada. The three-man Good Offices Committee also set up by the resolution faced a difficult task as Peiping, rebuffed in the hesitant steps which it seemed to be taking away from the strict Moscow policy, returned precipitately to a close liaison with the Soviet Union.

Has the United States abandoned the effort to attract Asian revolutionary leaders and encourage them to assert their independence of Russia, as foreshadowed in Secretary of State Acheson's National Press Club speech of January 12, 1950? Whatever Washington's intentions, the objective results of recent policies seem to be a strengthening rather than a weakening of the Soviet bloc in Asia.

FRED W. RIGGS

(The second of two articles.)

\*See *Foreign Policy Bulletin*, Feb. 2, 1951.

## Branch and Affiliate Meetings

LYNN, March 5, *The Administrators of American Aid in Europe*, Alfred E. Chase  
DETROIT, March 6, *Point Four*, Alfred H. Kelly  
ELMIRA, March 6, *Turkey, the Near East and American Foreign Policy*, Nuri Eren  
PHILADELPHIA, March 6, *Germany's Role in the World Today*, Ernst Reuter, Brig. Gen. Frank J. Howley  
DETROIT, March 8, *The Problems of Latin American Countries*, Phillip Wernette  
PROVIDENCE, March 11-17, World Affairs Week  
BETHLEHEM, March 12, *The Road to Survival*, William Vogt  
NEW YORK, March 15, *How Strong Is Russia?*, Howard C. Gary.

## News in the Making

**INDIA-PAKISTAN TRADE ACCORD:** The first full trade pact between India and Pakistan since the former devalued its currency in September 1949 was negotiated on February 24. The new agreement will benefit both nations, since it restores to each its normal markets and sources of supply. India is to supply coal, steel, pig iron, cement, timber and textiles in return for jute, cotton, food grains, hides and skins. Indian sources hail the pact but stress that it can do little to alleviate their current food shortage.

**THE DUTCH ECONOMY:** As a result of the delay in forming a new cabinet in the Netherlands—the previous one resigned on January 24—certain important economic and financial controls are still pending. The Dutch balance of payments has worsened in recent months because Germany, its principal export market, has followed an increasingly restrictive trade policy. Commercial circles in Amsterdam agree that some exports must be diverted to Britain, though probably at lower prices.

**BRITANNIA'S WAVES:** Opposition Leader Winston Churchill's criticism on February 22 of the proposed appointment of an American to command the Atlantic pact's naval forces has raised a stir in Britain. Although the debate coincided with an intensification of British party politics, the task of assuaging such national sensitivities will be an important one for General Dwight D. Eisenhower.

**FRENCH CABINET CRISIS?:** The government of Premier René Pleven may be upset by imminent parliamentary tests over the question of electoral law reform. New general elections must be held this year. If the present proportional system, which favors the larger parties, is used, the Communist and Gaullist returns would probably be so large as to make continuance of the "third force" regime impossible. But the relatively strong Popular Republicans threaten to leave the cabinet if the majority-vote, two-stage system is adopted. This system enables moderate groups to unite on compromise candidates.

FOREIGN POLICY BULLETIN. Vol. XXX, No. 21, MARCH 2, 1951. Published weekly from September through May inclusive and biweekly during June, July and August by the Foreign Policy Association, Incorporated. National Headquarters, 22 East 38th Street, New York 16, N. Y. BROOKS EMENY, President; VERA MICHELES DEAN, Editor; WILLIAM W. WADE, Associate Editor. The Foreign Policy Association contributes to public understanding by presenting a cross section of views on world affairs. The Association as an organization takes no position on international issues. Any opinions expressed in its publications are those of the authors. Re-entered as second-class matter June 4, 1948, at the Post Office at New York, N. Y., under the Act of March 3, 1879. Four Dollars a Year. Please allow at least one month for change of address on membership publications.